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Meijer and Singh: News From the International Criminal Tribunals

NEWS FROM THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS
Part II—ICTY*
by Cecile E.M. Meijer and Amardeep Singh**
v

General
Proceedings
By December 31, 2000, the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY),
in its seventh year of existence, had completed four trials on
the merits, namely the Erdemović, Tadić, Aleksovski, and Furundzija cases. The Trial Chamber had completed a total of eight
trials on the merits: the Celebići, Jelisić, Kupreskić, and Blaskić cases,
in addition to the aforementioned cases that were subsequently decided on appeal. Three additional trials came to
an end in 2000, but no judgements were rendered during that
year: in June 2000, the Appeals Chamber heard the appeals
in the Celebići case, while proceedings before the Trial Chamber were completed in the Kunarac, Kovać and Vuković trial
in November 2000, and closing arguments in the Kordić and
Cerkez trial were heard in December 2000. As of December 31,
2000, on-going trials on the merits included the Kvocka, Kos,
Radić, Zigić and Prcać case (Trial Chamber I), the Krstić case
(Trial Chamber I), and the Krnojelac case (Trial Chamber II).
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Indictments and Arrests
At the close of the year 2000, the ICTY had a total of 26
public indictments, involving 65 persons. Of those accused,
34 were in detention at The Hague, 4 were provisionally
released, and 27 persons were still at large.
During the same year, five suspects were arrested by SFOR
(NATO Stabilization Force) on charges pending before the
ICTY: Vasiljević, Prcać, Krajisnik, Nikolić, and Sikirica. In addition, Naletilić was deemed healthy enough to allow for his
transfer from Croatia to the UN Detention Unit in The
Hague. Given the nature of the charges against Prcać, the Trial
Chamber decided to join his case with the Kvocka et al. case
that had just started, which meant that Prcać went to trial
almost immediately following his transfer to The Hague.
v

v

Ad Litem Judges
In May 2000, ICTY President Judge Jorda presented to the
Security Council a report that reflects, inter alia, on the consequences of, and the possible solutions to, the increased workload at the tribunal. The Security Council responded to
these needs in its Resolution 1329 of November 30, 2000, and,
acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, decided, inter
alia, to create a pool of ad litem judges for the ICTY and to
enlarge the membership of the Appeals Chambers to include
judges of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR). To accomplish this, the Security Council amended
and replaced the relevant articles in the ICTY Statute and the
ICTR Statute.
With regard to the ad litem judges for the ICTY, the ICTY
Statute now provides that the General Assembly will elect 27
ad litem judges upon nominations from UN Member States.
The pool of 27 ad litem judges is elected for four years. The
UN Secretary General will appoint from among this group,
upon the request of the ICTY’s President, ad litem judges “to
serve in the Trial Chambers for one or more trials, for a
cumulative period of up to, but not including, three years.”
There is a maximum at any one time of nine such ad litem
judges that can serve at the ICTY. A Trial Chamber can have
up to six ad litem judges at any one time, in addition to its three
permanent judges.
Trial Chambers
v

Kupreskić Judgement
On January 14, 2000, Trial Chamber II issued its judgment
in the case Prosecutor v. Kupreskić et al., Case No. IT-95-16-T,
v
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involving Zoran Kupreskić, Mirjan Kupreskić, Vlatko Kupre skić, Drago Josipović, Vladimir Santić, and Dragan Papić.
The accused, all Bosnian-Croats, were charged with regard to
their alleged role leading to and during an attack on the Muslim civilian population of the Bosnian village of Ahmići on
April 16, 1993. Ahmići is located in central Bosnia and is of
mixed Muslim and Croat heritage. The attack resulted in the
massacre of 116 inhabitants of the village, 24 people wounded
and the destruction of 169 houses and two mosques.
The Trial Chamber found the massacre was a “well-planned
and well-organised” attack by Croat forces against Muslim civilians to expel all Muslims from Ahmići. Zoran and Mirjan
Kupreskić were both found guilty of persecution as a crime
against humanity. Zoran was sentenced to ten years imprisonment, and Mirjan was sentenced to eight years imprisonment. Vlatko Kupreskić was found guilty of aiding and abetting persecution as a crime against humanity and sentenced
to six years imprisonment. Drago Josipović and Vladimir
Santić were both found guilty of persecution, murder, and
other inhumane acts as crimes against humanity. Josipović was
sentenced to 10, 15, and 10 years imprisonment, to be served
concurrently, inter se; Santić was sentenced to 25, 15, and 10
years imprisonment, also to be served concurrently, inter se.
All those convicted received credit for time served. Dragan
Papić was found not guilty of persecution as a crime against
humanity and was released immediately.
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Factual Findings
The Trial Chamber began by addressing background
events that led to the April 16, 1993, massacre. Among other
things, the Trial Chamber declined to characterize the conflict between the Croats and Muslims as an international or
internal armed conflict because the indictment contained no
accusations of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions,
which require proof of an international armed conflict.
Further, the Trial Chamber found tensions between Muslims and Croats in the region rapidly escalated in 1992, and
resulted in a “policy of discrimination” by both groups against
the other. The Trial Chamber looked extensively at the facts
surrounding the events of April 16, 1993, in Ahmići and
found that the massacre was a planned attack carried out by
Croat forces against the Muslims civilians of Ahmići for the
purpose of “ethnic cleansing.” Specifically, the Trial Chamber
found that the object of the attack was to “destroy as many Muslim houses as possible, to kill all the men of military age, and
thereby prompt all the others to leave the village and move elsewhere.” In addition, the Chamber found the attack constituted
a form of “‘personalised violence,’” i.e., “violence directed at
specific persons because of their ethnic identity.”
Findings of Law
Tu Quoque Principle
The Trial Chamber addressed the validity of the tu quoque
principle as a defense to accusations of breaches of International Humanitarian Law (IHL). In examining this principle,
the Tribunal looked specifically at the proposition that
“breaches of international humanitarian law, being committed by the enemy, justify similar breaches by a belligerent.”
In strong language, the Trial Chamber rejected the validity
of the tu quoque principle, stating that it is “fallacious and
inapplicable” in IHL. The Trial Chamber stated that most IHL
“lays down absolute obligations, namely obligations that are
unconditional or in other words not based on reciprocity.”
The Tribunal found not only support for this in Common
continued on next page
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Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions, but also in the development of IHL rules into obligations owed to the entire
international community as a whole, “designed to benefit individuals qua human beings.” The Chamber also pointed out
that the tu quoque defense was raised in war crimes trials following World War II but “was universally rejected.” In addition, the Chamber stated that most IHL norms, particularly
those pertaining to war crimes, crimes against humanity,
and genocide, are peremptory norms of international law or
jus cogens, and thus are non-derogable. Consequently, the tu
quoque defense can never be valid because obligations of IHL
are not dependent upon any other party’s conduct.
Crimes Against Humanity and Persecution
The Trial Chamber also analyzed the elements of a crime
against humanity within the meaning of Article 5 of the ICTY
Statute. With regard to the element that the alleged crime
must be part of a widespread or systematic occurrence directed
against a civilian population, the Trial Chamber held that the
meaning of the term “civilian population” should be construed
liberally. Furthermore, following previous ICTY jurisprudence, the Tribunal acknowledged that even a single act can
amount to a crime against humanity, provided it was committed within a widespread or systematic context.
According to the Trial Chamber, the law regarding the
mens rea of a crime against humanity is not yet settled but
appears to be “the intent to commit the underlying offence,
combined with . . . knowledge of the broader context in which
that offence occurs.”
The Trial Chamber also discussed the scope of “other
inhumane acts” as crimes against humanity under Article
5(i) of the ICTY Statute. The Tribunal stated that this category was meant as a residual category, and that its manifestations were not exhaustively enumerated. To qualify under
this category any such acts should be as serious as the other
acts enumerated under Article 5 of the ICTY Statute. For the
identification of such crimes, resort may be made to international human rights law instruments.
The Trial Chamber spent considerable time discussing persecution within the meaning of Article 5(h) of the ICTY
Statute. In particular, it addressed the issues of whether persecution must be charged in connection with other crimes in
the Statute, as well as what the actus reus of persecution is, and
how to define it. As for the first issue, the Trial Chamber held
that no link is required between persecution and other crimes
found in the Statute. The Chamber reasoned that the development of customary rules concerning crimes against humanity, as evidenced by, inter alia, Control Council Law No.10,
national legislation, case law, international treaties such as the
Convention on Genocide and the Convention on the NonApplicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and
Crimes Against Humanity, as well as the Tadić Appeals on
Jurisdiction case, indicated that the required nexus between
crimes against humanity and war crimes had been eliminated.
Regarding the issue of what constitutes the actus reus of persecution, the Tribunal looked at case law of several international and national criminal tribunals. It found that their interpretation of persecution, which included acts already covered
by other types of crimes against humanity, was reflective and
indicative of persecution within the context of customary
international criminal law. The Trial Chamber concluded that
“acts enumerated in other sub-clauses of Article 5 can thus
constitute persecution.” Moreover, the Trial Chamber concluded that “persecution can consist of the deprivation of a
wide variety of rights,” including attacks on political, social and
economic rights. Thus, a “persecutory act need not be prohibited explicitly either in Article 5 or elsewhere in the
Statute,” or even be illegal under domestic law. Finally, the
Tribunal held that persecution is usually understood as a series
of acts that are part of a policy and a certain context; thus,

persecutory acts must be “examined in their context and
weighed for their cumulative effect.” However, the Tribunal
also acknowledged that a single act can constitute persecution if, among other things, the perpetrator’s discriminatory intent has been proved.
The Trial Chamber searched for “clearly defined limits on
the types of acts which qualify as persecution” as a crime
against humanity and arrived at the following definition of
persecution: “the gross or blatant denial, on discriminatory
grounds, of a fundamental right, laid down in international
customary or treaty law, reaching the same level of gravity as
the other acts prohibited in Article 5.”
Cumulation of Offenses
Another legal issue the Trial Chamber dealt with was
whether an accused may be charged and convicted with two
or more distinct crimes for the same transaction or event. The
Trial Chamber, citing the test the U.S. Supreme Court pronounced in Blockburger v. U.S., stated the Prosecutor may
cumulatively charge an accused where “each offence contains
an element not required by the other. If so, where the criminal act in question fulfils the extra requirements of each
offence, the same act will constitute an offence under each
provision.” The Chamber held that where the Blockburger
test fails, and the elements of one offense fall entirely within
the elements of another offense with additional elements not
contained in the first offense, then the principle of lex specialis
requires that the accused only be charged with the more
specialized offense.
The Trial Chamber applied these tests to several scenarios, including whether an accused may be charged with inhumane acts as a crime against humanity and cruel treatment
as a war crime for the same act. The Chamber held that
because inhumane acts as a crime against humanity contain
the additional element of a widespread or systematic practice,
but that otherwise the two crimes have the same elements (in
other words, as a war crime no different element is required),
the principle of lex specialis requires that the more specialized
inhumane acts as crimes against humanity only be charged,
or that both crimes be charged in the alternative.
Applying the above principles, the Tribunal found Drago
Josipović and Vladimir Santić not guilty of murder and cruel
treatment as a violation of the laws or customs of war, because
they had been convicted of the more specialized crimes of
murder and inhumane acts as a crime against humanity.
v
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Blaskić Judgement
On March 3, 2000, the Trial Chamber issued its judgement
in The Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskić, Case-No. IT-95-14-T, after
a lengthy two-year trial. General Blaskić was indicted in his
capacity as commander of the Croatian Defence Council
(HVO) for atrocities committed against Bosnian Muslims
between May 1992 and January 1994, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly in the La sva Valley region. Specifically,
Blaskić, in his capacity as commander of Bosnian Croat forces,
was charged with six counts of grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions, eleven counts of violations of the laws or customs of war (of which the Prosecution withdrew one), and
three counts of crimes against humanity. The alleged crimes
included, inter alia, persecution, unlawful attacks upon civilians and civilian objects, willful killing and serious bodily
injury, as well as destruction and plunder of property.
Blaskić was commander of the HVO armed forces headquarters in central Bosnia during the time period covered by
the indictment (in mid-1994 he was promoted to General).
In his capacity as military commander, Blaskić was accused of
having “planned, instigated, ordered or otherwise aided and
abetted in the planning, preparation or execution” of the
crimes alleged, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute
(individual criminal responsibility). He was not accused of havv
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ing personally committed the alleged crimes. In addition, or
in the alternative, and pursuant to Article 7(3) of the ICTY
Statute, Blaskić was accused of having known or having had
reason to know that his subordinates were preparing to commit the crimes outlined in the indictment, or that they had
already committed them, and he had done nothing to prevent the crimes from being committed or to punish the perpetrators (superior or command responsibility).
In its statement of the applicable law, the Trial Chamber
began by addressing two key issues that are necessary for the
applicability of Article 2 of the ICTY Statute (grave breaches):
the international nature of the armed conflict and the status
of the victims as protected persons. The Trial Chamber concluded that the armed conflict was international in character, based on the direct and indirect intervention by Croatia
in the conflict at the relevant time and place. Once again it
applied the “overall control” test, enunciated in the Tadić
Appeals Judgement, to the circumstances of the case. Similarly, the Trial Chamber followed the Tadić Appeals Judgement to determine that the victims were protected persons.
The Tribunal stated that “[i]n an inter-ethnic armed conflict, a
person’s ethnic background may be regarded as a decisive factor in determining to which nation he owes his allegiance and
may thus serve to establish the status of the victims as protected
persons.” Considering the main purpose and goal of the Geneva
Convention, however, it is actual relations and not formal ties
that must be regarded in determining a protected status.
The Trial Chamber also addressed the scope and elements of Article 3 of the ICTY Statute (violations of the laws
or customs of war) as well as the material elements and mens
rea required for crimes against humanity within the meaning
of Article 5 of the ICTY Statute. It elaborated on the meaning of a ‘widespread or systematic attack directed against
the civilian population,’ and discussed the elements of murder, persecution, and other inhumane acts as crimes against
humanity, with which Blaskić had been charged.
Because Blaskić, as a military commander, had been
charged with both individual criminal responsibility and
superior responsibility, the Tribunal examined Article 7(1)
and 7(3) of the ICTY Statute. After the Celebići case, this was
the second time that an ICTY Trial Chamber had to address
the crucial legal concept of superior responsibility.
As far as the accused’s liability under Article 7(1) of the
Statute is concerned, the Trial Chamber discussed the legal
definitions of the different modes of participation. The Trial
Chamber first discussed the applicable mens rea for Article 7(1)
of the Statute and held that the mens rea for one who plans,
instigates, or orders the commission of a crime is that “he
directly or indirectly intended that the crime in question be
committed.” The Chamber made note that in general, “a person other than the person who planned, instigated or
ordered” the crime is the one who usually perpetrates the actus
reus of the crime. Therefore, the person perpetrating the
crime must be doing so “in furtherance of a plan or order.”
The Trial Chamber then defined the terms “planning” and
“instigating.” Quoting the Akayesu Judgement of the ICTR, the
Trial Chamber stated that “planning implies that ‘one or several persons contemplate designing the commission of a crime
at both the preparatory and execution phases.’” This may be
proven with direct or circumstantial evidence. The Trial Chamber also concurred with Akayesu regarding the scope of “instigating,” which involves “‘prompting another to commit an
offence.’” Thus there must be proof of a “causal connection”
between the instigation and perpetration of the crime.
Finally, the Trial Chamber defined the actus reus and mens
rea for aiding and abetting. Agreeing with the Trial Chamber
in Furund zija, the Blaskić Trial Chamber quoted it as stating
that “‘the actus reus consists of practical assistance, encouragement, or moral support which has a substantial effect on
the perpetration of the crime.’” The Blaskić Trial Chamber
v
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further held that the actus reus of aiding and abetting may
occur through an omission, as long as the “failure to act had
a decisive effect on the commission of the crime.” The aider
and abettor’s mens rea consists of “knowledge that his acts assist
the commission of the crime,” and, additionally, he must
have “intended to provide assistance, or as a minimum,
accepted that such assistance would be a possible and foreseeable consequence of his conduct.” Again quoting Furundzija, it is sufficient that the aider and abettor knows that
“‘one of a number of crimes will probably be committed.’”
Blaskić was charged in addition, or in the alternative, with
liability under Article 7(3) of the Statute which states that an
accused may be held liable for the acts of a subordinate
where the accused “knew or had reason to know that the subordinate” was about to commit a crime under the Statute or
had already committed the crime, and the accused failed to
take the “necessary and reasonable measures” to either prevent the crime or punish the perpetrators. Concurring with
the Trial Chamber decisions in the Celebići and Aleksovski
cases, the Tribunal held that Article 7(3) consists of three elements: “(1) there existed a superior-subordinate relationship
between the commander (the accused) and the perpetrator of
the crime; (2) the accused knew or had reason to know that
the crime was about to be or had been committed; and (3) the
accused failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures
to prevent the crime or punish the perpetrator thereof.”
With regard to the first element—the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship—the Chamber agreed with the
Trial Chamber in Celebići and held that a position of command
need not merely be de jure, but may be de facto as well; as long
as the superior has “‘effective control’” over the perpetrators,
the requirements of the first element will be met. By “effective control,” the Trial Chamber, quoting Celebići, stated that
it meant that the superior should have the “‘material ability
to prevent and punish the commission’” of the crimes. It is,
therefore, not necessary that the commander have legal
authority over the perpetrator.
With regard to the mens rea required for liability under Article 7(3), the Trial Chamber made a distinction between
“actual knowledge” and “had reason to know.” With regard
to “actual knowledge,” the Trial Chamber held this may be
proved through direct or circumstantial evidence. To delineate the meaning of “had reason to know,” the Trial Chamber analyzed post-World War II case law and Additional Protocol I. It concluded that “if a commander has exercised
due diligence in the fulfillment of his duties yet lacks knowledge that crimes are about to be or have been committed,
such lack of knowledge cannot be held against him.” The Trial
Chamber furthermore held that if a commander is ignorant
of crimes being committed by subordinates because of “negligence in the discharge of his duties,” then the commander
“had reason to know” for purposes of Article 7(3) of the
ICTY Statute.
Finally, with regard to the element of whether the commander took reasonable measures to prevent the commission
of the crime, the Trial Chamber held that it is the commander’s “degree of effective control, his material ability” that will
determine the extent to which he will be held responsible for
taking action against perpetrators, or preventing the commission of crimes.
Next, the Trial Chamber analyzed the facts pertaining to
what happened in the Lasva Valley between May 1992 and January 1993. It also examined extensively the facts regarding several attacks on different municipalities in Central Bosnia
during the course of 1993, and focused in particular on
Blaskić’s criminal responsibility as a military commander.
The Tribunal concluded it was proved beyond all reasonable
doubt that Blaskić had ordered attacks targeting the civilian
Muslim population. Accordingly, the Tribunal held him
criminally liable for the crimes committed during such attacks.
v
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The Trial Chamber also concluded that Blaskić, as commander, had failed “to take the necessary and reasonable measures which would have allowed these crimes to be prevented
or the perpetrators thereof to be punished.”
The Trial Chamber found Blaskić guilty on all counts
except one (the shelling of Zenica), and sentenced him to 45
years in prison, with credit for time already served.
v

Part III—ICTR*
Appeals Chamber
Kambanda Judgement
In Jean Kambanda v. The Prosecutor, dated October 19, 2000,
Case No. ICTR 97-23-A, the Appeals Chamber rendered judgement on the appeal by Rwanda’s former prime minister Jean
Kambanda against the Trial Chamber’s judgement and sentence of September 4, 1998. Specifically, the Trial Chamber had
sentenced Kambanda to life imprisonment after he pled guilty
to four counts of genocide, which included genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and public incitement to
commit genocide, and complicity in genocide, as well as to two
counts of crimes against humanity for murder and extermination. In a Consolidated Notice of Appeal, Appellant advanced
in total eight grounds of appeal challenging, inter alia, his
guilty plea and the sentence imposed by the Trial Chamber.
Specifically, the Appeals Chamber was asked to quash the
guilty verdict and order a new trial, or, should that fail, to revise
the sentence. The Appeals Chamber unanimously rejected
all grounds of appeal and affirmed both Kambanda’s conviction on all counts and the sentence of imprisonment for the
remainder of his life.
In the first ground of appeal, Kambanda alleged that he was
denied the right to be defended by counsel of his choice. The
Appeals Chamber rejected this ground of appeal, holding that
the Appellant should have brought this issue to the attention
of the Trial Chamber judges, and that Appellant had waived his
right by not so doing. Also, the Tribunal concluded no special
circumstances had been shown regarding his attorney’s incompetence, which would have justified an exception to this waiver
principle. The Appeals Chamber also rejected the second
ground of appeal, which contested the legality of his detention
in Tanzania outside the Tribunal’s Detention Unit. The Appeals
Chamber reiterated the aforementioned general principle of
waiver unless exceptional circumstances are shown.
Kambanda’s third ground of appeal concerned the validity
of his guilty plea. Specifically, the Appellant claimed that the
Trial Chamber erred in not examining whether the plea was
voluntary, informed and/or unequivocal, and failed “to ascertain appropriately whether the guilty plea was based on sufficient facts for the crimes alleged and the accused’s participation in them.” Although the Appeals Chamber could have
decided this issue by finding that Appellant had waived his rights
by not raising them before the Trial Chamber, the Appeals
Chamber stated “as this is the Chamber of last resort for the
Appellant facing life imprisonment on the basis of his guilty
plea, and as the issues raised in this case are of general importance to the work of the Tribunal, the Appeals Chamber
deems it important to consider the question of the validity of
the guilty plea.”
In analyzing the validity of the guilty plea, the Appeals
Chamber followed the standards expressed in the Joint Separate Opinion of Judges McDonald and Vohrah in the Erdemović
appeal, which had been adopted by the majority of the Appeals
Chamber in that same case. In this context, the Tribunal
examined whether Kambanda’s guilty plea was voluntary,
informed and unequivocal, and concluded that all of these
requirements had been satisfied.

With respect to the “voluntary” requirement, the Tribunal
followed the standard set forth in Erdemović, and held that
“the conditions for accepting a plea agreement are firstly that
the person pleading guilty must understand the consequence
of his or her actions, and secondly that no pressure must have
been brought to bear upon that person to sign the plea agreement.” The Appeals Chamber found no arguments of mental
incompetency or failure to understand the consequences of his
guilty plea on Kambanda’s part. In addition, it noted Appellant did not claim any prohibited threat or inducement that
had led Kambanda to plead guilty.
As for whether the guilty plea was “informed,” the Appeals
Chamber agreed with the Appellant and the Prosecution that
the proper standard was articulated in Erdemović, “such that the
accused must understand the nature of a guilty plea and the
consequences of pleading guilty in general, the nature of the
charges against him, and the distinction between any alternative charges and the consequences of pleading guilty to one
rather than the other.” In this case the Appellant was found to
be informed.
The Appeals Chamber also agreed with the standard established in Erdemović that “‘[w]hether a plea of guilty is equivocal must depend on a consideration, in limine, of the question
whether the plea was accompanied or qualified by words
describing facts which establish a defence in law.’” The Appeals
Chamber noted that neither the court transcripts nor the allegations put before the Tribunal showed that the Appellant had
persistently tried to explain his actions or that he raised any
defenses. It also noted the Trial Chamber had explicitly questioned Kambanda to verify the validity of his guilty plea according to the standards set forth in Erdemović. In conclusion, the
Appeals Chamber found no merit in the claim that Kambanda’s guilty plea was not unequivocal.
Finally, the Appeals Chamber rejected Appellant’s contention that the Trial Chamber failed to satisfy itself that the guilty
plea was based on sufficient evidence of the crime and Kambanda’s participation in it. The Appeals Chamber reasoned
that the Prosecution and the Appellant had explicitly agreed on
the facts in their mutual Plea Agreement on which the guilty plea
was based. The Tribunal denied the third ground of appeal.
The remaining five grounds of appeal each concerned
arguments that the Trial Chamber erred in the sentencing. The
Appeals Chamber examined whether imposing a single sentence for multiple convictions was allowed and appropriate.
Based on the wording of the ICTR Statute, practice of the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg, as well as ICTR and
ICTY jurisprudence, the Tribunal answered both questions in
the affirmative. The Tribunal also addressed Appellant’s assertions that “the Trial Chamber erred in law in failing to properly take certain mitigating circumstances into account.” Examining the Trial Chamber’s judgement, however, the Appeals
Chamber found the Trial Chamber “clearly considered each
of the above factors put forward by the Appellant in mitigation
in reaching its decision and as required in the Statute and Rules
and therefore to this extent did not commit an error of law.”
Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber looked at the weight that
must be attached to mitigating factors and held that such
determination lies within the Trial Chamber’s discretion.
Given the serious nature of the crimes, the Appeals Chamber
considered life imprisonment to fall “within the discretionary
framework” of the ICTR Statute and Rules. Thus, these five
grounds of appeal also were found to be without merit. 
* Volume 8, Issue 1 of the Human Rights Brief covered the Appeals
Chamber of the ICTY. Volume 8, Issue 3 of the Human Rights Brief
will cover the remaining 2000 jurisprudence of the ICTR and some
recent case law from the ICTY.
** Cecile E.M. Meijer is the legal coordinator of the War Crimes
Research Office at the Washington College of Law. Amardeep Singh
is an LL.M. candidate at the Washington College of Law and an
associate editor for the Human Rights Brief.
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